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MANAGED NEWS, STIFLED VIEWS:
FREE EXPRESSION AS A CASUALTY OF
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
by Gara LaMarche*
1
"Above all things, truth beareth away the victory."

"If the American President had control of the media, his job would
be much easier. "2
"We just don't discuss that capability. I can't3 tell you why we don't
discuss it, because then I'd be discussing it."
It is curious to see.., what a stimulus the return of
peace has given to political agitation. As nothing is
now dependent on the fortune of war, orators and
writers are entering the arena with a confidence they
never displayed as long as their arguments and
predictions were liable to reversion or falsification at
the hands of Lee or Grant.4
War is the most profound action any government can take,
and for that reason the decision to wage and conduct it must be
" Executive Director, The Fund for Free Expression; Chair, American Civil
Liberties Union Free Speech and Association Committee; Former Program Director,
Freedom-to-Write Committee, PEN American Center; Executive Director, Texas
Civil Liberties Union.
The author and the Journalof Human Rights thank Michael J.P. D'Angelo,
B.A., University of Arizona; J.D., New York Law School, for his valuable
contribution to the legal analysis portion of this article. Mr. D'Angelo is Assistant
Counsel for the New York State Public Service Commission, Office of General
Counsel.
1 Apocrypha: 1 Esdras.
2 Excerpts From Iraqi Document On Meeting U.S. Envoy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990,
§ 1, at 19 (U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie to Saddam Hussein).
' Just Not Fit for Discussion, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 25, 1991, at 3 (Assistant
Secretary of Defense Peter Williams, in response to a reporter's question about airlaunched cruise missiles).
' NATION MAG., July 6, 1865.
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subject to the continuing scrutiny of a well-informed public. But in
recent U.S. military operations, culminating in the recent war in the
Persian Gulf, the government has treated the press as an
inconvenience and an obstacle to its efforts, rather than respecting its
role as an independent means of presenting information to the
American public.
Operation Desert Storm s and the preparations for it
institutionalized curbs on the right of the news media to cover
military operations. Reporters were required to travel in "pools"
accompanied by military escorts, with all dispatches reviewed in
advance by a military censor. Moreover, in apparent deference to
Saudi Arabia, the staging ground for allied operations, the
Department of Defense censored publications sent to U.S. troops in
the Gulf, imposed restrictions on what they could say or write about
a variety of topics, and impeded their freedom to engage in Christian
and Jewish worship.
This article summarizes the unprecedented restrictions placed
on the press during the recent Persian Gulf war and analyzes their
impact on the public's right to know; discusses war-related freedom
of expression issues on the home front; anaylyzes the constitutional
significance of the restrictions; and makes recommendations for
reforms to assure that the First Amendment is not a permanent
casualty of the government's penchant for news management.
I. MILrrARY CENSORSHIP IN THE PERSIAN GuLF

A. Operation Desert Storm Press Restrictions
On January 7, the United States Department of Defense
issued rules for news media personnel covering Operation Desert
Storm (then called Operation Desert Shield):6
. Only reporters who were members of a "pool" selected by
military officials were permitted to cover hostilities.
. Reporters were required to stay with a military affairs
"escort" at all times.
s West Had NuclearArms Ready In Gulf War, Says Swedish Officer, REUTERS, Sept.
27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt File ("Operation Desert Storm [is]
the official name of the offensive to liberate Kuwait.").
' The Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558,
1560 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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. Reporters' dispatches were subject to a "security review"
by military officials before release.7
Each of these rules hampered the ability of the news media to cover
military operations and obstructed the American public's right to
know what is being done in its name. The "pool" requirement,
employed during the U.S. invasion of Panama,' makes it much
easier for the military to exclude the media from any coverage at all
of certain operations and generally works to exclude all but the
mainstream and established media. It should be used, if at all, for
surprise operations where unlimited physical access for all reporters
is not possible.
The escort requirement has a chilling effect on the willingness
of soldiers in the field to speak freely to the news media. Ron
Nessen, who covered the Vietnam War for NBC News and later
served as President Ford's press secretary, asked, "When a reporter
has an officer standing over his shoulder at all times, what soldier
being interviewed will spill his guts and speak his personal truth?"9
CBS News President Eric Ober, who was an infantryman in Vietnam,
posed a similar question and answered it, "If Bob Simon, CBS News'
veteran war correspondent, interviews the soldier with a military
escort by his side, will the soldier really tell the truth? Will we really
find out what is
happening in the desert? I have to conclude that the
10
no."
is
answer
A former Pentagon official in the Reagan and Bush
Administrations, Fred S. Hoffman, argued that the Administration
did not make a persuasive case for the security review system: "In
my view, the Pentagon intends to impose de facto field censorship
without calling it that. A security review is prior restraint. It is
censorship by the Government and could be abused to protect the
military from criticism or embarrassment."" In addition to its
potential for restricting criticism and coverage of ineptitude or
malfunctioning equipment that could embarrass the military, the
7Id. at 1565 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA (1991)).
8Id. at 1563.
9 Sydney

H. Schanberg, Pentagon - Pasteurized News Tastes Bad, NEWSDAY, Jan.
11, 1991, at 65.
10 Eric Ober, A War is Waged for the Public's Right to Know, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
1991, at A10.

" Michael R. Gordon, Rules for Journalists: Necessity or Prior Restraint?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1991, at All.
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mechanisms of prior review make it virtually impossible to get the
news out in a timely fashion. As Ron Nessen has written, the
security review rules are "[gireat if you're covering the war for a
monthly magazine or, better yet, for an annual review, 2but useless if
you're covering it for a network or daily newspaper.'
On January 10, 1991, The Fund for Free Expression, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the American Library Association,
the Association of American Publishers, the Committee to Protect
Journalists, the National Coalition Against Censorship and PEN
American Center, wrote to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to express
strong opposition to the new rules."s A lawsuit raising a First
Amendment challenge to the rules was filed the same day by the
Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf of eleven magazines and
news agencies (The Nation, Harper's,PacificNews Service, The Guardian,
The Progressive,Mother Jones, L.A. Weekly, The Village Voice, In These
Times, The Texas Observer, and Pacifica Radio News) and five writers
(Sydney H. Schanberg, E.L.
Doctorow, William Styron, Michael Klare,
4
and Scott Armstrong).'

This is an action

.

.

.

challenging regulations

promulgated by the United States Department of
Defense ("DOD") to govern coverage of military
activities of American armed forces overseas during
periods of open hostilities.
Plaintiffs urge[d] that the DOD "pooling" regulations,
which limit[ed] access to the battlefield to a specified
number of press representatives and subject them to
certain restrictions, infringe on news gathering
privileges accorded by the First Amendment.'
The government made no effort to justify the imposition of
more onerous restrictions than were in place during the entire
Vietnam War, when reporters could travel freely on their own and
file reports without submitting them to military censors. In order to
appreciate how we have traveled the distance from relative openness
12

Ron Nessen, The Pentagon's Censors, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1991, at A21.

"The Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558,
1563 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
14 Id.
IS Id. at

1560-61.
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to highly controlled management of the press, a brief survey of past
relations between the military and the press is in order.
B. Previous Practices
1. World War II. - In a Twentieth Century Fund background paper
on the military and the media, Peter Braestrup writes, "[A]merican
newsmen were allowed easy access to the battlefield in 1941-45. 16
While they did not go everywhere, Braestrup explains, it was
because there were simply not enough reporters to cover all land, sea
and air battles.17 In its lawsuit challenging the new Pentagon rules,
The Nation Magazine and other plaintiffs asserted that during World
War II,
correspondents flew on bombing missions, rode
destroyers, went on patrols, [and] accompanied
assault troops in the first stages of battle in numerous
invasions, including the invasion in North Africa, the
invasions of Sicily, Guadalcanal, the Philippines and
Iwo Jima. Correspondents accompanied the first
waves of forces landing on the Normandy beaches on
18
D-Day.

2. Vietnam. - Eric W. Ober writes,

During the Vietnam War, reporters could go
anywhere - anytime - often with the military taking

us along. There were two basic restrictions in
Vietnam. First, that no troop movements be reported
prior to engagement. Second, that no faces of dead
or wounded soldiers be shown before their families
had been properly identified. Both restrictions were
totally understandable, and there were virtually no
violations of the guidelines by any American news
organization. 9
'6PETER BRAESTRUP, BATTLE LINES: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA

27 (1985).

17Id.
18 Complaint at 10-11, The Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense,
762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (91 Civ. 0238).

'9Ober, supra note 10, at A10.
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Ron Nessen recalls that in Vietnam,
to get to the fighting, you got from the Caravelle
Hotel to Tan Son Nhut airbase by taxi or in your
rented jeep or on your motorscooter... when it was
time to file, you simply transmitted the film,
broadcast radio spots from the ancient PT studios or
telexed your copy
directly to the home office. There
2
0
censors.
no
were
And yet as public support for the war in Vietnam waned, the
Administration and many military officers came to believe that the
press coverage resulting from an open policy played a principal role
in shifting public opinion -- that the press lost the Vietnam War for
the United States.21
In a survey of generals who served in command positions
during the Vietnam War, Douglas Kinnard found that 38% believed
that newspaper coverage "[o]n the whole tended to be irresponsible
and disruptive of United States efforts in Vietnam."'
As for
television coverage, 39% said it was "probably not a good thing in
balance because such coverage tends to be out of context," and 52%
said it was "not a good thing, since there was a tendency to go for
the sensational, which was counterproductive to the war effort."'
The military's belief that the press coverage of Vietnam sapped
public support for the war is reflected in the remarks of a "senior Air
Force officer" who began a briefing in Saudi Arabia in January of
1991, by telling reporters, "Let me say up front that I don't like that
press. Your presence here can't possibly do me any good, and it can
24
hurt me and my people."
3. Grenada.- The post-Vietnam attitude was first seen at work during
the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983. The Nation Magazine
claimed in a recent editorial criticizing the new Pentagon rules that
the Reagan Administration established the precedent
for total censorship in the Grenada invasion, having
20Nessen, supra note 12, at 22.
21 DOUGLAS KINNARD, THE WAR MANAGERS

130-33 (1977).

Id. at 132.
Id. at 132-33.
24Malcolm W. Browne, Conflicting Censorship Upsets Many Journalists, N.Y.
2
2

TIMES, Jan. 21, 1991, at A10.
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watched with envy how Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher kept the ever-servile British press under
very tight restrictions and banned television crews
from the Falklands during her brief and successful
war to recapture that colony from Argentina.'

Members of the press were not permitted to accompany the invasion
force and were kept from entering the island until "conditions were
safe."' Several journalists made their way to Grenada in defiance
of the ban, but were intercepted by the military, and detained
incommunicado on a U.S. Navy commandship for over two days.'
After an initial uproar by the press, the Defense Department
permitted a small number of journalists access to the island, but only
with military escorts.' Restriction on the press continued for at
least a week after the invasion, even though hostilities had been
concluded.29
4. The Sidle Commission. - Because of the controversy over the
handling of the press during the Grenada invasion, the Pentagon
appointed an internal commission, headed by retired Major General
Winant Sidle, to review relations between the news media and the
military."° The Commission held hearings in February 1984 and
released its recommendations the following August.3' While some
retired journalists served on the Commission, all major media
institutions refused to provide representatives for the Commission on
the grounds that participation would be a conflict of interest.
The Commission's recommendations included stepped-up
"public affairs planning" for military operations, pooling of reporters
if necessary to ensure early access to an operation, with the "largest
possible pooling procedure to be in place for the minimum time
25 No News: Bad News, NATION MAG., Jan. 28, 1991, at 76.

' See Janice Castro, Keeping the Pressfrom the Action; for the First Time, a Major
U.S. Military Operation is Blacked Out, TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 65.

' Patrick J. Sloyar, The War You Won't See: Why the Bush Administration Plans
to Restrict Coverage of Gulf Combat, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1991, at C2.
28Id.
' Marjorie Hunter, U.S. Eases Restrictionson Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1983,
at A12.
3'Janice Castro, Peace Pact on War Coverage; New Press Guidelines Return to Tried
and True Principles,TIME, Sep. 3, 1984, at 73.
31Press Combat Access Report Issued, Facts on File World News Digest, Aug. 31,
1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni File.
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possible," reliance on "voluntary compliance by the media with
security guidelines or ground rules established and issued by the
military, 3 2 and various forms of technical and logistical assistance
to help the news media cover military operations.' On October 9,
1984, the Department of Defense formally announced the
establishment of the "Department of Defense Media Pool" to cover
the initial stages of surprise military operations.3
These
recommendations were largely ignored during the U.S. invasion of
Panama that began on December 20, 1989.'
5. Panama. - The official press pool was denied access to cover
military operations until the second day of invasion, after the
fightihg had ended at Rio Hato and Patila, and was barred from
getting close to fighting still going on at Commandancia."3' Their
"main source of information turned out to be CNN broadcasts of
Pentagon briefings from Washington. 37'
Hundreds of other
journalists who arrived to cover the events were restricted to a
military base.' According to Patrick Sloyan, senior correspondent
of the Washington Bureau of Newsday, the muzzling of the press in
Panama created the "illusion of bloodless battlefields."39
Those images effectively erased the reality that 23
U.S. servicemen were killed and another 265
32

During the recent war, for example, Department of Defense guidelines

requested that "the following information should not be reported because its
publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives," and
listed, among other things, "information on intelligence collection activities,"
"information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover,
deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire" and "information on operational or
support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces." No press
organization questioned the appropriateness of these guidelines, and there were no
incidents of non-compliance. UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF DEFENSE, GUIDELINES FOR
NEWS MEDIA (Jan. 24, 1991).
' CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS PANEL

(Aug. 23, 1984) [hereinafter SIDLE PANEL REPORT], reprinted
in BRAESTRUP, supra note 16, app. at 167.
' Peter Schmeisser, Shooting Pool: How the Press Lost Their Gulf War, NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 1991, at 21.
aSId.
(SIDLE PANEL), REPORT

Sloyan, supra note 27, at C2.
37 id.

3 Id.
39

Id.
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wounded and seriously injured in three battles in the

first day, not a single photograph, strip of film or
eyewitness account was published about the
moments of combat at the Commandancia, Rio Hato
or Patila Airport.'
"The Panama affair included a flat claim by Army Lt. Gen.
Tom Kelly, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs [of Staff], that
he knew of 'no casualties' occurring during a hazardous low-altitude
'
night paratroop drop."41
It was a month afterward that the Army
admitted eighty-six had been hurt in the operation.'
Following the Panama invasion, the Department of Defense
commissioned a report by one of its former officials, Fred S.
Hoffman.'
It concluded that excessive concern for secrecy
prevented the Defense Department's media pool from reporting the
critical opening battles and produced stories and pictures of
essentially secondary value." He also emphasized the need for the
Pentagon to render assistance to the pool to cover combat from the
start of operations.4
There is still a dispute stemming from the Panama invasion
over media efforts to gain access under the Freedom of Information
Act to official military footage of the combat. Robert Hall, a deputy
to Peter Williams, the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Public
Affairs, asserts that "[c]ombat photography is for combat use -internal use," despite claims that the photos may shed light on the
continuing controversy over the extent of injuries and deaths
Operation "Just Cause" inflicted on Panamanian civilians.46
C. Effects of Press Restrictions During Operation Desert Storm
Five days before the U.S. and allied forces began the bombing
of Iraq, Newsday columnist Sydney Schanberg, who won a Pulitzer
Prize for his New York Times reporting from Cambodia, complained
'oSloyan, supra note 27, at C2.
41Id.
4

Id.

"FRED S.

HOFFMAN,

REVIEW OF PANAMA POOL DEPLOYMENT, DECEMBER 1989

(March 1990).
44Id.

at 2.

at 17.
' Sloyan, supra note 27, at C2.

4'Id.
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that most of the articles filed since August from the Persian Gulf had
been "soft" stories, claiming that "human interest pieces about how
our soldiers are faring in the heat, features about planes being
refueled in mid-air, stories about Dan Quayle's visit, stories about the
lousy military food, etc., etc. - and this soft journalism is the direct
product of the press controls."'47
In the early hours of the conflict, Schanberg asked where
"were the counterparts of the reporters who in 1944 hit the beaches
of Normandy with the first waves of troops on D-Day? Why, they
were at some headquarters or other - on an aircraft carrier, in a
He
briefing room, or on an escorted visit to an air base."'
compared reporters to "wrap-up sportscasters sitting in the studio,
not on the field."'49 Jon Katz, a media critic and teacher at New
York University, argued that television's heavy use of retired military
officials as commentators is "a substitute for actual reporting."' The
day after the war began, Michael Getler, assistant managing editor
for foreign news at The Washington Post, complained that U.S. officials
had yet to provide "a more detailed assessment as to what's
happened," such as what targets had been hit, and the estimate of
civilian casualties.5 In The Wall Street Journal, Robert Goldberg
summarized the television coverage of the war: "[Flor all the air
time, there was, and is, surprisingly little information. The Pentagon
is keeping a tight lid on the U.S. side, and over the weekend, both
Israel and Iraq imposed censorship. Combat pictures are in even
52
shorter supply than facts. Mostly, this is news by press release."
Not long after the end of hostilities, a different picture of the
war has emerged from the one the Pentagon put on display during
hostilities. It turns out, for example, that only 7% of the ordnance
dropped on Iraq were "smart" precision bombs.' The rest were the
Schanberg, supra note 9, at 65.
8 Sydney H. Schanberg, We Need to See the War, Not Spokesmen, NEWSDAY, Jan.
18, 1991, at 121.
49Id.
I Alex S. Jones, Feast of Viewing, But Little Nourishment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
1991, § 1, at 10.
s Neil A. Lewis, Government's Strict Orders Limit Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
1991, at All.
52 Robert Goldberg, CNN Winning Electronic War, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1991, at
A9.
' Barton GeUrnan, U.S. Bombs Missed 70% of Time, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1991,
§ 1, at 1.
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old-fashioned kind that miss their targets as much as 75% of the time
- and kill many more civilians in the process.' The U.S. public got
a different impression because, for example, the Defense Department
"suppressed a film showing a U.S. smart bomb early in the war
accidentally striking a civilian building in downtown Baghdad, across
from the Interior Ministry."'
D. Press Pools
At the height of the war, there were approximately 1,400
journalists in the Persian Gulf.'M Only 192 of them, including
technicians and photographers, were placed in press pools with
combat forces." According to The New York Times,
in the six Army and two Marine divisions near the
Kuwaiti and Iraqi borders with Saudi Arabia, totaling
more than 100,000 men and women, only 25 to 30
pool slots exist for newspaper, magazine, radio and
television correspondents. Some divisions have one
journalist assigned to them, some to none. NO
reporter from the New York Times had spent a single
day as an authorized correspondent with American
ground forces until Sunday (February 10).'
Testifying before a February 20, 1991 Senate hearing on press
coverage of the war, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Pete Williams defended the rules, asserting that, without them,
"masses of reporters would try to wander through the war zone,
risking their lives and those of the troops."'
With limited
exceptions, however, such as D-Day (when 20 reporters were
assigned to the entire United States First Army),' pools were not
5

Id.

' R. Jeffrey Smith & Evelyn Richards, Many Bombs May Have Missed, WASH.
POST, Feb. 22, 1991, § 1, at A25.
5' Richard I. Berke, Pentagon Defends Coverage Rules, While Admitting to Some
Delays, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1991, at A14.
S7 Id.

' R.W. Apple, Jr., Correspondents Protest Pool System, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1991,
at A14.
Berke, supra note 56, at A14.
o Braestrup, supra note 16, at 37.
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used in any U.S. war until the 1983 invasion of Grenada.6 ' The
Defense Department commission appointed after widespread
criticism of press restraints during the Grenada invasion called for
limited use of pools only if necessary to assure early press access to
a military operation, and then only for "the minimum time
possible."62
Enforcement of the pool requirement during the war
was characterized, in the words of Associated Press reporter Mort
Rosenblum, who was detained for three hours for reporting without
an escort,' by "strong-arm" tactics on the part of the military:
. A wire service photographer working outside the military
pool system was held for six hours by U.S. marines who
threatened to shoot him if he left his car. "We have orders
from above to make this pool system work," an officer told
him."
New York Times reporter Chris Hedges had been
interviewing shopkeepers in Saudi Arabia when he was
picked up on February 10 by U.S. military authorities,
detained for five hours and sent back to his hotel in Dhahran
without press credentials. When two days later Hedges went
to the press center in Dhahran to retrieve his press
credentials, officials refused to admit him for half an hour,
telling him he had an "attitude problem. '
. A BBC television crew had its credentials removed for
three days.6
. A French TV crew was forced at gunpoint by U.S. marines
to give up videotape it had shot of U.S. soldiers wounded in
the battle to retake the Saudi town of Khafji. 67 Robert Fisk
of the British Independent said the crew "filmed the Khafji
fighting at great risk to their lives, broke no security
guidelines and then had their tape confiscated because they
61 Id.

at 120.

62BRAESTRUP,

supra note 16, app. at 166, citing SIDLE

PANEL REPORT, supra note

33.
' Howard Kurtz, JournalistsSay 'Pools' Don't Work, WASH. POsT, Feb. 11, 1991,
at Al [hereinafter Kurtz, 'Pools'].
"Glenn Frankel, JournalistsTell How Iraqis Censored their Reports, WASH. POST,
Feb. 9, 1991, at A13.
Apple, Jr., supra note 58, at A14.
Kurtz, 'Pools', supra note 63, at Al.
67 Richard Zoglin, Jumping Out of the Pool, TIME, Feb. 18, 1991, at 39.
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were not members of the pool."'
• Other journalists apprehended, detained or threatened
with detention include Eric Schmitt and John Kifner of The
New York Times, Guy Gugliotta of The Washington Post, John
King and Fred Bayles of the Associated Press, and Joseph
Albright of Cox Newspapers."

These journalists tried to break free of government censors to
do their job of gathering the news. But even reporters who have
cooperated with the procedures have been stymied. When pool
reporter Douglas Jehl of the Los Angeles Times reported that 50 U.S.
military vehicles were missing, censors cleared his story, but later
complained it was contrary to the "best interests" of the military and
ordered him to leave the press pool.70
It appears that some reporters were so frustrated by the pool
system that normal competition for stories was accelerated to an
extreme degree. Robert Fisk reported that when he approached a
Marine unit outside Khafji, a U.S. network reporter "started shouting
abuse at me, telling me to go back to Dhahran and saying I would
spoil it for the pool," and calling over a U.S. Marine public affairs
officer and a Saudi police officer, who threatened to pull his
accreditation.7 According to Fisk, "the people in the pool... have
lost some of their critical faculties and become part of the military
machine. '
Another issue raised in connection with the press pools was
preferential treatment of American and British journalists. Three
hundred European and Asian journalists were restricted to three
combat reporting spaces,' and Agence France-Presse sued the U.S.
Department of Defense -- without success -- over its exclusion from
the photo pool. 4
In contrast to the barriers imposed on foreign journalists, the
Pentagon sponsored a special program which has flown almost 1,000
Robert Fisk, Marching Ordersfor the Media, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1991, at B7.
Apple, Jr., supra note 58, at A14.
'oZoglin, supra note 67, at 39.
Fisk, supra note 68, at B7.
7 Kurtz, 'Pools', supra note 63, at Al.
Alice Rawathorn, JournalistsThreaten to Defy Restrictions,FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1991, at 2.
74
A Nerve - Gas Tip: Never Throw Away the Empties, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1991,
at A18.
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local U.S. reporters to visit Saudi Arabia at military expense.' The
"hometowners" spent up to four days with troops from their cities,
and what they wrote was often extremely favorable to their military
hosts.7 6 Bob Locke, a city editor at The El Paso Times, who visited
the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade and 3rd Armored Cavalry
regiment, stationed in nearby Fort Bliss, told The Texas Observer that
"we couldn't afford to send anyone otherwise."'
Free-lance reporters were also being discriminated against in
their effort to cover the Gulf War. Reporters were unable to enter
Saudi Arabia without a visa, and according to a number of
publications and writers that sued to block implementation of the
rules, the Administration appears to have favored those journalists
whose coverage was likely to be favorable to the war effort.7' In
addition, only persons regularly employed by "newsgathering
organizations" were exempted from the embargo on expenditures in
Iraq and Kuwait, a distinction which disadvantaged free-lance
journalists.
The best-known case of non-compliance with Pentagon press
pools was that of CBS correspondent Bob Simon and his threemember crew, who were missing for over three weeks until they
turned up on Baghdad, under detention by the Iraqi military, on
February 15. Simon had been quoted in the New York Times and
USA Today expressing frustration with what he viewed as the
Pentagon's effort to "sanitize" news coverage of the war. 9
The military's efforts to limit press access to the troops
extended even to those killed in battle. Shortly after the start of the
war on January 16, the Pentagon initiated a ban on public and media
access to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, where the bodies of the
U.S. soldiers are returned from the war.'
The American Civil
Liberties Union, representing several journalists, the Military Families
' Howard Kurtz, News Chiefs Vow To Resist Pentagon War Coverage Rules In
Future,WASH. POST, May 14, 1991, at A4.
76Id.
" Debbie Nathan, Desert Shielded, TExAS OBSERVER, Jan. 11, 1991, at 15.
78The Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1588
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
" Howard Kurtz, CBS News Crew Held in Baghdad, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1991,
at Cl; David Mills, CBS Reporter Chafed at Restrictions, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 1991,
at D1.
' Howard Kurtz, Dover Closings Challenged; ACLU Sues for Access to Arrivals of
Gulf War Dead, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1991, at A2.
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Support Network, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and
other groups, filed suit to overturn the ban, asserting that the
Pentagon has offered no national security justification for the new
policy and dismissing the Government's contention that privacy
considerations are involved, because individual servicemembers are
not identified.'1 Kate Martin, the principal ACLU attorney in the
case, argued that "the sole reason the base has been closed is that the
government doesn't wish the American public to see graphic images
of numbers of caskets lined up, and that's an unconstitutional
reason.'0 2 The case was dismissed on March 8, 1991, by U.S.
District Judge Royce C. Lamberth.a
E. Security Review
It didn't take long to bear out concerns that the Pentagon's
new advance "security review" of dispatches would be used as a tool
of prior restraint. Some early practical examples were provided by
Malcolm W. Browne of The New York Times in a January 20, 1991
dispatch from Saudi Arabia." Browne said he and other reporters
in the authorized pool heard officers claim that U.S. forces had
destroyed Iraqi nuclear laboratories.' The unit commander denied
permission to report the attacks, on the grounds that the information
could assist Iraqi intelligence operations.' But shortly afterward,
the information was reported in detail by U.S. military commanders
during their daily news briefing. According to Browne, "the
Pentagon is clearly eager
to be the first to report the most
'
87
newsworthy information."
Browne also claimed that "varying interpretations of the rules
imposed by the Pentagon have virtually blanked out timely
publication of some articles that had been cleared by local
commanders."' He went on:
81Id.
12 Id.

' Judge Bars Coverage Of Return Of Dead U.S. Troops, REUTERS, Mar. 8, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire File.
" News Dispatch from Malcolm W. Browne in Saudi Arabia (Jan. 20, 1991)
[hereinafter News Dispatch].
85
Id.
6 Id.

v Id.
88 Id.
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A pool dispatch prepared by The New York
Times reported that F-117A radar-evading Stealth
bombers launched the war against Iraq with precise
laser-guided bombs that destroyed key targets in
Baghdad.
An Army public information officer cleared
the dispatch on the spot for transmission to pool
headquarters in Dhahran and then to news
organizations themselves. But more than three hours
later, the unit commander had second thoughts about
the dispatch, striking out a paragraph and changing
the words and phrases in others.
To hasten the transmission of the news, the
Times reporter agreed to the proposed changes so that
American publications and news services could
receive it in time for deadlines.
The next day, however, the reporter learned
that the entire article had been suppressed by the F117A unit headquarters in the United States. More
than a day after it was written, when it had become
stale news, the dispatch was cleared in its original
form.89

Although the Pentagon's rules provide that "material will be
examined solely for its conformance to... ground rules, not for its
potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment," 9 there is
evidence that so-called "security reviews" went beyond any legitimate
miliary needs.
. New York Times reporter James LeMoyne, who completed
a Persian Gulf assignment in December, claims that "[t]hree
Pentagon press officials in the gulf region said they spent
significant time analyzing reporters' stories in order to make
recommendations on how to sway coverage in the Pentagon's
favor." When one of LeMoyne's articles quoted Army
enlisted personnel who criticized President Bush and
questioned the purpose of the war, press officials canceled a
scheduled interview with General Norman H. Schwarzkopf,
News Dispatch, supra note 84.
supra note 32.

90 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
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commander of the American forces, and did not reschedule
it for one and a half months. According to LeMoyne, for six
weeks after the article, almost all print news reporters were
denied access to Army units.'
. Pilots aboard the USS John F. Kennedy told an Associated
Press reporter they had been watching pornographic movies
before flying bombing missions. A military censor deleted
the information as "too embarrassing," and deleted one pilot's
use of an obscenity. 2
. When a Detroit Free Press reporter filed a story describing
returning pilots as "giddy,"a censor changed it to "proud.""

Apart from direct orders to change the wording of articles,
Pentagon officials also exercised control over information about the
war by withholding approval until material is no longer
newsworthy." Scripps-Howard reporter Peter Copeland asserts that
military officials delayed his reporting with Saudi pilots for 53
hours." Military officials also referred, to "stealth" headquarters in
Nevada, a New York Times pool dispatch on reported "stealth"
bomber attacks on Baghdad.', The material was not cleared until
the next day.'
Department of Defense Assistant Secretary Peter Williams
defended the security reviews in a talk before the National Press
Club on March 14, 1991." The system was not one of censorship,
Williams argued, but "instead, a procedure that allowed us to appeal
to news organizations when we thought material in their stories
would violate the ground rules . . . [leaving] the final decision to
publish or broadcast in the hands of journalists, not the military." 99
He went on to claim that only five stories were submitted for review
James LeMoyne, Pentagon's Strategyfor the Press: Good News or No News, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1991, § 4 (Week in Review Desk), at 3.
'Howard Kurtz, Correspondents Chafe Over Curbs on News; Rules Meant to
Protect Troops, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991.
93id.

9 Id.
95Id.

96 Id.

Kurtz, supra note 92.
Address by Peter Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense, before the

National Press Club (Mar. 14, 1991) (on file with author).
9Id.
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by Pentagon authorities in Washington."w What these claims fail
to take into account, however, is the deterrent effect of such rules -any reporter knows that his or her press credentials can be revoked
for failure to submit dispatches for review, and a time-consuming
bureaucratic procedure for approval of stories leads inevitably to selfcensorship.
The U.S. public does not seem to be troubled by restrictions
on the press. A poll conducted by the Washington, D.C.-based Times
Mirror Center for People and the Press found that 78% believed the
military is "telling as much as it can."' 0' Given a choice between
increasing military control over information or leaving it to news
organizations, 57% favored the military. 2 A Washington Post/ABC
News poll found that 62% favored bombing a Baghdad hotel used as
a command and control center even when reporters are staying there,
Five percent
if the reporters remain following a warning."°
°
favored bombing without any warning."
F. Other Curbs on Expression by U.S. Service Personnel
1. Reading Material and Correspondence.- Magazines and periodicals
donated for mailing to troops were screened by military commanders
to bar material that "might be offensive to Saudi sensitivities"" s
with decisions "being left to military commanders who have
knowledge of local customs and cultures.""
A clearer sense of the standards emerged from a Washington
Post story about a project to airlift to Saudi Arabia magazines read
and discarded by U.S. military families in Germany.
You can't just load a cargo jet full of Peoples
and U.S. Newses and Sports Illustrateds and ship it to
Saudi Arabia. These magazines are chockablock with
ads featuring full-color photos of legs, chests, navels
100Id.

0 Alex S. Jones, Poll Backs Control of News, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1991, at C24.

10

Id.

"cHenry Allen, The Gulf Between Media and Military, WASH. POST, Feb. 21,1991,
at Di.
104 Id.
'" The Media Business; Free Magazinesfor the Gulf Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1990, at D12.

106Id.
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and other assorted body parts that are no go in
Islamic countries.
Enter ever-present American ingenuity and
the ever-ready energy of high school students with
felt-tip markers in the fingers and time on their
hands.
...

Some magazines would have to be tossed out -

entirely religious publications, magazines specializing
in nude pictures. But... most could be sent south
after just a few minutes of coloring.1 7
Efforts by other private groups to provide reading material
that is substantively "acceptable" ran afoul of a Department of
Defense policy against tobacco advertising. With the encouragement
and cooperation of the Defense Department, a South Carolina
magazine publisher established a non-profit organization to ship
magazines to troops in Saudi Arabia."~ The first shipment of more
than 100,000 magazines, supported by a special grant from the R.J.
Reynolds tobacco company, contained magazines wrapped in a
special cover with the Operation Desert News logo on front, and a
Camel cigarette ad on the back."° The Defense Department
insisted that the magazines cannot be shipped unless the ad is torn
off, and has refused to consider the option of a disclaimer. 110
Some publications had less difficulty finding their way to
troops in the Gulf. The Kuwaiti Embassy in Washington paid for the
mailing of 200,000 copies of The Rape of Kuwait, a paperback by Jean
Sasson."'
There was at least one documented instance of disciplinary
action against a soldier for comments about conditions and morale
at the front. Dick Runels, an Air Force reservist, worked as a civilian
mechanic at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, near New Baltimore,
Michigan. After his call-up to duty in the Gulf war, he worked as an
March Fisher, For the Troops, Touch Up and Go; Military Coverup Puts Clothes
on Magazine Pix, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1990, at C1.
11 Charles Truheart, Magazines' Cover Blown, Cigarette Ad Delays Shipment to
Troops, WASH. POsT, Dec. 21, 1990, at D1.
107

109Id.
110

Id.

Edwin McDowell, Sales of Mideast Books Surge on News of War, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 1991, at D16.
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aircraft maintenance crew chief in Saudi Arabia. That October, while
in Saudi Arabia, The Voice, a weekly newspaper based in New
Baltimore, began to publish Runel's letters describing Runel's views
on the conditions under which the troops labored.'12 In one letter,
Runels described "frustration at a system that has [the troops]
completely under its control.""' 3 After his second letters for approval
to his base commander in Saudi Arabia,"" Runels refused to submit
future letters for prior approval." 5 In his first letter written after
his reprimand, Runels wrote to The Voice,
All I did was write about people, what they've
experienced here and how they are dealing with
being treated like children and betrayed by their own
government, while at the same time being told they
are here to 'protect democracy' -- protect democracy
in countries that have sheikhdoms and absolute
despots ruling them." 6
2. Opinions on "Controversial" Topics. - The Department of Defense
went to unprecedented lengths to ensure that service personnel do
not say anything that might offend the Saudi monarchy or its
subjects. The information pamphlet circulated to all troops in Saudi
Arabia urged them to avoid mentioning a host of topics, including:
* Articles and stories showing U.S.-Israeli ties and
friendship.
. Material deemed immoral or critical of state policies or
actions; pictures of men and women embracing, kissing, in
sexual encounters, dancing; images of male or female nudity.
" Ads for pork or shellfish.
" Arab student demonstrations in the United States.
" Anti-Arab demonstrations in the United States.
* Films or newsclips featuring pro-Zionist actors and
actresses (e.g. Barbra Streisand, Liz Taylor).
* Discussing U.S. involvement in supporting Israel and
..
2 Dick Runels, Desert Shield A Reservist's Chronicle, HARPER'S MAG., Feb., 1991,
at 26.
113
Id. at 27.
"' Id. at 26.

Id.

115

116Id. at 28.
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Israel's current presence in Lebanon; U.S. strategic
cooperation with Israel.
• Implying that the United States might consider an
intervention action in the Gulf without being "invited."
* Discussing the "Jewish lobby" and U.S. intelligence given
to Israel.
. Discussing strategic cooperation between the United States
and any country in the AOR (Area of Responsibility).
. Discussing the host country's reservations about the
peaceful intentions of other Arab States.
" Discussing the presence and role of AWACS in the AOR.
" Discussing unfavorable actions by Arabs while out of the
AOR, such as "playboy"-type activities; misrepresentation of
Arabs in the U.S. press.
" Proselytizing for non-Islamic religions.
" Implying that any Arab country is totally dependent on
foreign manpower for its economic and military structure.
• Photographing airport or port facilities, military sites,
women, religious sites, or anything that would cast a
negative light on the host country.
. Referring to the Arab blacklisting of U.S. companies that
do business with Israel or the Arab boycotting of companies
that have strong Zionist representation in executive
positions." 7

For the first time in over fifty years of entertaining U.S.
troops abroad during the holiday season, comedian Bob Hope was
limited to "handshake and autograph" meetings with small groups
of service members."' When actor/comedian Steve Martin and his
wife, the actress Victoria Tennant, appeared before 500 troops of the
24th Mechanized Infantry Division, Martin told them, "They said
they didn't want us to do a show ....

What we're going to do is

what they call a 'grip and grin.""'9 Later, in New York, Martin
added that:
[A]s far as I can tell, there's a couple of reasons for

...
See Tom Tugend, Israel Is Taboo Subject for U.S. Gulf Troops, JERUSALEM POST,

Oct. 29, 1990.

McCombs, USO's Desert No-Show; Arab Sensitivities, Security Curtail
Celebrity Tours, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1990, at D1.
119 Id.
118Phil
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the change in policy. One is a little nervousness over
the Saudis.... You probably have to stay sensitive to

their worries over salaciousness. If you have a
female in a bikini, they might object. On the other
hand, as my wife said, if an army came to America
and put on cockfights and bear-baiting, we might
object. 2°
The military's concern also extends to soldiers' comments on
appropriateness of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. When Army Lt.
Alexander Dumas told a reporter, "If they [the Iraqis] were
threatening us, I'd be ready to lay down my life in a minute -- but
this is different," a senior officer warned him that such comments
could "get [him] in trouble."'"
Predictably, the scope of concern
shown by military escorts extends well beyond topics even arguably
related to national security. When one Marine told a journalist that
the food was too starchy, Marine Major General James McClain
intervened to say, "You're not an' expert on the components of food.
Keep to your area of expertise."'
3. Religious Belief. - According to The Rutherford Institute, a
conservative public interest law group, troops stationed in the
Persian Gulf were prohibited from receiving shipments including
bibles and other religious materials."2
II. WAR-RELATED FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ISSUES IN THE U.S.

A. Questioningof Arab-American Groups
Shortly before the start of the Gulf War, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation interviewed Arab-American individuals and
organizational officials to gather information about possible terrorist
activity in the United States. 124 According to Nazih Baydia,
120 Id.

121Molly Moore, Speaking Out on the Gulf. Voices at Home and Abroad; Doubts
About U.S. Involvement Grow Among Troops in the Gulf,WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1990, at

Al.
Military, Media Face Off in Gulf, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1991, at Al.
Rutherford Institute Upset with Saudi Conditions, UPI, December 19, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
124Sharon LaFraniere, FBI Starts Interviewing Arab-American Leaders; Watch
Ordered on Iraqi Embassy, Mission, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1991, at A14.
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regional director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, who was interviewed by F.B.I. officials, the interrogation
contained "political questions."'" Baudia said, "They asked if the
Palestine community is supportive of Saddam Hussein,
if the Iraqi
26
community thinks the invasion of Kuwait is right.'
The specter of singling out persons and organizations for
questioning based on their membership in a racial or ethnic group or
their presumed sympathy with a foreign government or political
causes raises serious civil liberties questions. There is a sorry history
of governmental abridgment of the rights of racial and ethnic
minorities during wartime and foreign policy crises, including the
World War I harassment of recent German immigrants, the World
War II internment of Japanese-Americans," 7 and the deportations
of Iranian students during the 1980 hostage crisis." a In each of
these instances, the minority group involved and critics of the U.S.
foreign policy at issue were also the targets of harassment,
persecution and violence from private individuals and groups. 2 9
This experience calls for special government efforts to protect
the rights of racial and ethnic minorities and political groups which
may be at risk of such abuse during a period of tension or hostilities
with another country. Instead, the F.B.I.'s actions appear to go in the
opposite direction. There is of course a legitimate government
interest in curbing terrorist acts. But law enforcement investigations
should be based, under existing F.B.I. guidelines, on reasonable
suspicion that specific criminal activity is taking place -- not on race,
ethnicity or belief."
In addition to its offensiveness on equal protection grounds,
such an approach presumes the disloyalty of millions of ArabAmericans and persons of Arab origin lawfully residing in the
125

Id.

126 Id.

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
"'John M. Goshko, Carter Orders Deportation of Illegal Iranian Students, WASH.
POST, Nov. 11, 1979, at Al.
" Christopher Dickey &Charles R. Babcock, ImmigrationChecking Visa of Iranian
Students, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1979, at Al.
" See generallyDavid Johnson, Report Cites F.B.I.'s Following of TerroristSuspects,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1990, at Al (an Oct. 1990 General Accounting Office Report

found that the F.B.I. had opened 19,000 counter-terrorism investigations from 19821988, 40% involving U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens).
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United States, and has a chilling effect on their rights to take part in
the public debate over the appropriateness of U.S. actions in the
Persian Gulf.
In a letter to the Washington Post defending his agency's
contacts with Arab-Americans, F.B.I. Director William S. Sessions
claimed,
The persons who were contacted are not regarded
as targets or suspects. The contacts were voluntary,
and the individuals were certainly not subjected to
any form of interrogation, surveillance or
investigation. Quite the opposite, we have turned to
these individuals for assistance as we carry out our
mandate of protecting this country from acts of
terrorism. Although the initial contacts have been
completed, it remains critical during the current
situation that the F.B.I. continue to have dialogue
with the Arab-American community."'
Yet many Arab-Americans who were approached by F.B.I.
agents to participate in such a "dialogue" have expressed a sharply
different view. New York Newsday reported the following incidents:
. On January 11 and 18, agents interviewed at least five
people at spice shops, stores and restaurants on Atlantic
Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. Agents carried lists of
names and asked if the interview subjects knew the people
listed and asked if their neighbors, or they themselves, had
any knowledge of terrorism.
* Over a period of four months, F.B.I. agents asked
Palestinian-Americans in the New York City area about their
travel plans, contacts with Arab-American community
leaders, and knowledge of their activities, including possible
contacts with terrorist groups.
. An Egyptian-American who frequents a Brooklyn mosque
was visited at his home in the Bay Ridge section of Brooklyn
in late December. He was first asked his opinions of Rabbi
Meir Kahane, who was killed on November 5, but then asked
about his possible involvement and that of others in terrorist
1

Fighting Terrorism and Guarding Rights, WASH. PosT, Feb. 14, 1991, at A22.
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groups.
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. A Lebanese-born American who works as an electronics
engineer for the Federal Communications Commission in
Washington says that the F.B.I. questioned him on the
political views of the Arab Community. When agents
originally went to his office on a day he was out sick, they
questioned his co-workers about him."'
The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee logged
only five "hate" crimes against Arab-Americans in the first seven
months of 1990, but 34 in the final months of that year, following
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait."
In January, 1991, the group said,
immediately before and after the start of the war, there were fiftyeight reported crimes, more than in all of last year." s
In addition to the F.B.I. program and private acts of violence
and intimidation against Arab-Americans, there was discriminatory
action by businesses, such as Pan-American Airways' policy barring
Iraqi nationals from its flights (a policy rescinded on February 22,
1991, following a lawsuit filed by the center for Constitutional Rights
and a complaint lodged with the New York City Human Rights
Commission),"
and incidents of arrest and detention by
government agencies based on no apparent reason other than ethnic
origin -- a Jordanian couple held for over 12 hours by Nassau
County, N.Y. police on a minor traffic offense,'37 an Iraqi merchant
crewman imprisoned without charges by the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service. 138
On January 10, 1991, the Justice Department ordered
immigration authorities to photograph and fingerprint anyone
entering the United States with an Iraqi or Kuwaiti passport. 39 The
Wall Street Journal reported that members of suspected "pro-Iraqi
132

Emily Sachar, F.B.I. GrillsArab-Americans, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, 1991, at 6.

" Stephanie Saul, Anti-Arab Hate Crimes Up in U.S.; Incidents Surge Since War's
Start, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 7, 1991, at 19.
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Feb. 23, 1991, at 14.
Sheryl McCarthy, BashingArabs to Silence Debate, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 6,1991.
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cells" have been under surveillance since August and will be
rounded up in the event of a war,"4 but F.B.I. has no plans along
those lines,"'. and to date it does not appear that any elements of
the plan were put in place.
Fears that such measures will be instituted have been
generated by reports of a 1986 "contingency plan," which the INS
claims was drafted by "low-level staffers" and disavowed when it
became public in 1987, for dealing with "Alien Terrorists and
Undesirables."'" The 31-page plan was drawn up after the U.S. air
attack on Libya in April 1986, and called for the "wholesale"
invalidation of visitors or nonimmigrant visitors in a particular
nationality group, jailing without bond, closed deportation hearings
and a policy of using "fallback" charges when the main charge in a
case could not be substantiated. 43
B. Other Issues
Wars and tensions leading up to them have in the past placed
corollary strains of freedom of expression. One such strain is
intolerance for dissent. In the words of New York Times columnist
Anna Quindlen, "[fIrom the beginning, it has been difficult to
publicly oppose this war, to express reservations or even forego the
exuberant displays of national accord."'" One poll revealed that
23% of the American public favored outright bans on anti-war
demonstrations.'4
While most public opinion supported the war, as manifested
in the profusion of yellow ribbons and American flags, there was an
emerging darker side of intolerance, seen most starkly in the case of
Marco Lokar." Lokar, a Seton Hall University basketball player,
returned with his pregnant wife to their native Italy following death
" Walter S. Mossberg, Fears of TerroristAttacks Bring Iraqis, Other Arabs Under
Close Surveillance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 1991, at A3.
"4'
Sharon LaFraniere and George Lardner, U.S. Set to Photograph,FingerprintAll
New Iraqi and Kuwaiti Visitors; UnusualMove Taken to Try to CounterPossible Terrorist
Attacks, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1991, at A23.
142Id.
-THE
FUND FOR FREE EXPRESSION, SEcRET TRIALS IN AMERICA? (une 14,1991).
'" Anna Quindlen, Reservations Not Accepted, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 1991, at 17.
Harper'sIndex, HARPER'S MAc., Apr. 1991, at 15.
Al Harvin, College Player Quits, Citing Threats Over Flag, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1991, at D23.
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threats they received after it became known that he was the only
member of the Seton Hall team not to wear an American flag on his
uniform as a show of support for the troops in the Persian Gulf.147
In Seton Hall's game against St. John's University in Madison Square
Garden on February 2, 1991, Lokar was booed by fans every time he
touched the ball."
The one U.S. correspondent who remained in Baghdad after
the start of the war (there were at least twelve foreign news
organizations there) was Peter Arnett of CNN, who came under a
barrage of criticism, led by Senator Alan Simpson (R-Wyoming), who
called him an Iraqi "sympathizer" for continuing to report from Iraq,
despite the fact that all his transmissions from there carry a
disclaimer that they are subject to Iraqi censorship. 149 When Arnett
reported that U.S. planes bombed a "baby milk plant" in Baghdad,
White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater accused CNN of
serving as a conduit for Iraqi "disinformation.""so Reed Irvine of
the conservative monitoring group Accuracy in Media said, "There's
''
no way his reporting is helping America win this war."
There were several instances of retaliation against journalists
who have questioned the propriety of the war. After he wrote
approvingly of an antiwar march, San Francisco Examiner associate
editor and columnist Warren Hinckle was put on a partially paid
three-month leave. "I take the position that I was censored," Hinckle
says." 2 The editor of The Kutztown Patriotwas fired after he wrote
an editorial calling for peace."s Village Voice national affairs editor
Dan Bischoff was canceled as a guest on the CBS news "Nightwatch"
program the Pentagon refused to provide anyone to appear on the
program if the Voice was going to be one of the participants.TM The
program's producer recalls a Pentagon representative as objecting on
147
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148Id.

Howard Kurtz, Sen. Simpson Calls Arnett 'Sympathizer,' WASH. POST, Feb. 8,
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" Howard Kurtz, White House Criticizes CNN Report, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,1991,
at A30.
1 Howard Kurtz, Media Dilemma: Breaking News, Iraqi Control, WASH. POST,
149

Feb. 14, 1991, at A25.
152

at 10.

Doug Ireland, Citizen Hearstvs. Citizen Hinckle, VILLAGE VoicE, Feb. 19,1991,

15 Quindlen,
1

supra note 144, at 17.

James Ledbetter, CBS Loses its Voice,

VILLAGE

VOiCE, Feb. 26, 1991, at 9.

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. IX

the grounds that "if someone from The Village Voice is on, that raises
the possibility that there will be a discussion of the merits" of the
lawsuit filed by the Voice and other media organizations challenging
the Pentagon press restrictions."s The Public Broadcasting System
postponed a rebroadcast of a Bill Moyers' "Frontline"program on the
Iran-Contra affair because, according to an internal PBS memo, the
program's raising of "serious questions about then-Vice Presidents
Bush's involvement and actions" make it "journalistically
inappropriate" during the war against Iraq, because "the program
could be viewed as overtly political by attempting to undermine the
President's credibility."'"
A thirty-second television commercial prepared by the
Military Families Support Network, an organization of people with
relatives serving in the Persian Gulf, was turned down by three
television stations in the Washington, D.C. area and by the Cable
News Network." 7 Against the backdrop of a photo of the Emir of
Kuwait followed by photos of flag-draped coffins, an announcer says:
"The Emir is waiting for Americans to go to war .... Don't send our
husbands, wives and our children to their deaths for this man and
A founder of the sponsoring group, University of
his oil."'"
Wisconsin professor Alex Molnar, claimed that the Kuwaiti
government "buying millions of dollars of television and radio time
to tell American parents their children should die for Kuwait. In the
face of this Goliath, a group of family members scrapes together
enough money to do a commercial, and we get turned [down] ...
it's kind of hard to swallow."'5 9 One D.C. area television station
official called the ad "exploitative and sensational," and another said
it "does not add to the community's dialogue on this very important
issue.""
While these actions by media organizations do not necessarily
raise constitutional issues under the First Amendment, they
contribute, along with other such incidents, to a climate in which
freedom of expression about the war is chilled.
155
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

This section will analyze the First Amendment rights of the
press and whether those rights were violated by the United States
Department of Defense during the Persian Gulf War. As previously
discussed, the Department of Defense exercised controversial control
over the press throughout the war. 1 Although members of the
press filed suit against the Department of Defense (DOD) in Nation
v. Department of Defense,"6 2 the district court exercised its discretion
and declined to consider the constitutional issues, leaving them "for
another day when the controversy is more sharply focused."'" The
Supreme Court, however, has set forth several tests which can be
applied to the DOD's actions during the Persian Gulf War.
The Court determines which of its analyses will apply,
according to the type of governmental restriction. Traditionally, the
Supreme Court decides if the regulations by the government restrict
the content of the speech or the conduct of the speaker. If the
restrictions turn on the viewpoint of the speech involved, then the
regulations are said to regulate content;164 however, if the
regulations concern the actions of the speaker and are neutral with
regard to the content of the speech, the conduct analysis is used.1'
This is an important distinction because content- based regulation
161See supra notes 6-15 & 56-104 and accompanying text.

l 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
" Id. at 1575. The courts have been extremely reluctant to rule on these types
of press restrictions in the past, claiming the issue to be moot and or exercising

discretion not to decide the constitutional issue. This further frustrates the press
because the short duration of the last three military actions has permitted the
legality of the DOD's controls continue to go uncontested. Flynt v. Weinberger, 588
F. Supp. 57,58 (D.D.C. 1984), affid 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal
but vacating district court's opinion and remanding without prejudice or opinion
on the merits of the claim).
1"See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) ("The conviction quite
clearly rests upon the asserted offensiveness of the words Cohen used to convey his
message to the public.... Thus, we deal here with a conviction resting solely
upon 'speech' ... .") (emphasis in original).
165 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,160-61 (1939) ("[A] person could not

exercise this liberty by taking his stand in the middle of a crowded street, contrary
to traffic regulations, and maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic ....
Prohibition of such conduct would not abridge the constitutional liberty since such

activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or
distribute information or opinion.").
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will be more strictly scrutinized by the Court.'
In the Persian Gulf War, the DOD's regulations and actions
involved both conduct and content.167 The most controversial
regulation of the press' conduct was the establishment of "press
pools."'1 The press pools severely impaired the ability of the press
to gather information because access to the military action was
extremely limited. The establishment of the press pools by the DOD,
and the ensuing regulations raise three constitutional questions: 1)
does the press have a right to access the battlefield with or without
military assistance, 2) did the DOD regulations constitute prior
restraint, and 3) was the requirement that reporters cover the war
only as part of an officially-designated pool the equivalent of a
license which would violate of the First Amendment. 69
A. The Press' Right of Access
The Court has analyzed the press' right of access in several
contexts, including trials,' voir dire examinations," pretrial
proceedings,172 prisons,' 3 and prison inmates."
Throughout
all of these decisions the Supreme Court has never ruled that the
press has a greater right of access than the public;" instead, the
Court has held that the press has a right of access in instances where
166 See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(2d ed. 1988)

at 789-804.
167
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 207-24 and accompanying text.
'70Richmond Newspaper v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality).
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
17 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
V3 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
'

'

17Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
has the Supreme Court ruled that the press does not have any greater
rights than the public. This is the subject of much debate. Given the language of
the First Amendment, explicitly prohibiting abridgment of the freedom of the press
and of speech, it would appear to be redundant if the press did not have somewhat
greater rights than an ordinary persons right to free speech. See Justice Potter
Stewart, Or of the Press,26 HAST. L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975) (reprinting a public address
given by Justice Stewart arguing that the Freedom of the Press Clause does have
independent constitutional significance).
1T5 Nor
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the public also has a right of access. 6 In Globe Newspapers Co. v.
Superior Court,'" for example, the Court held for the first time that
the First Amendment guarantees a right of access to trials because
"the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general
public""'v and "the right of access to criminal trials plays a
particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process
and the government as a whole.'" In order to deny this right of
access the government must show a compelling interest that is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.18 The Court has set up a
three-part test to determine if there is a right of access in a particular
situation: 1) has the place in question "historically been open to the
press and general public, 18' 2) does the right of access "play a
particularly significant role" in the functioning of the process at issue
and of the government as a whole,8 2 and 3) having met these two
elements, the government can infringe upon the right of access by
showing that its restriction is narrowly tailored to a compelling
governmental interest."l
In applying this three-part test to the press' right of access to
military operations during the Persian Gulf War, the issue of whether
the battlefield has historically been open to the press will be an
important factor to consider. As discussed previously, there is
factual evidence showing that, at the very least, the press has enjoyed
greater access in past military operations.'" It can also be argued
176

The court did not find this right in the express language of the First

Amendment but stated, "The First Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass
those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the
Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment
rights." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
I7 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
178 id.

17 Id. at 606. See also Paul G. Cassel, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military
Operations: The Right of Access, Grenada, and "Off-the-Record Wars," 73 GEO. L.J. 931,
955 (1985).

Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
605.
182 Id. at 606.
" Id. See Cassell, supra note 179, at 958-59. See contra Mary M. Cheh,Judicial
Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of Expression for Government
Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government Information, 69 CORNELL L.
'"

181Id. at

REv. 690, 730-31 (1984).
18 See supra notes 16-45 and accompanying text. See contra Cassell, supra note
179, at 932-42 & 955-64.
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that the press' right of access to the battlefield during military
operations plays a particularly significant role in the function of the
military and the government as a whole, because if the military could
ban all access to wartime information, the public would have no
viable method of ascertaining the military's actions."s
Nonetheless, if the first two prongs of the test are met, access
may still be denied if the governmental objective involved is
compelling and the restrictions are narrowly tailored to achieve that
objective."s The government has, in the past, claimed that national
security is a compelling government interest and the regulations in
question are narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 87 While
the Supreme Court has never decided a national security issue
involving press access, national security is most likely a compelling
government interest."s The analysis would therefore focus on
whether the DOD's constraints of press access were narrowly tailored
to achieve national security."8 9 Because the inquiry is fact specific,
it is not certain how the Court would resolve the question, if
confronted. For example, it could be argued that the surprise of a
first strike military action would justify a denial of press access to
achieve national security; however, after the first strike is delivered,
denial of press access to the battlefield is not narrowly tailored, since
national security is not necessarily jeopardized by disclosure."
See supra notes 21 & 24 and accompanying text. See also Cassell, supra note
179, at 941 n.80.
18 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
187 See, e.g., The Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp.
1558, 1561 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D.D.C. 1984).
" See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that
national security is compelling governmental interest). In general, the military is
afforded a high degree of discretion by the courts. See, e.g., United States v.
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 672 (1987) (holding "the Government is not liable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of
or are in the course of activity incident to service.") (citing Feres v. U.S., 340 U.S.
135, 146 (1950)). The holding from Feres is known as the Feres doctrine. Stanley,
483 U.S. at 672.
18 "Where a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state action
may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a precisely
drawn means of serving a compelling state interest." Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
180 Roger W. Pincus, Comment, Press Access to Military Operations: Grenadaand
the Need for a New Analytical Framework, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 813, 849 (1987)
(concluding that the access denial of the press by the DOD was constitutional on
the first day of the Grenada invasion but not on the second day).
185
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B. PriorRestraint

The next section will analyze the actions of the DOD rules
that constituted prior restraint and whether those actions violated the
First Amendment."9 Prior restraint is a legally different concept
than the right of access analysis. Right of access concerns the rights
of the press and/or other individuals to obtain certain information.
In contrast, prior restraint concerns the total or partial suppression
of information already gathered, to prevent dissemination. Prior
restraint also differs from other First Amendment restrictions which
punish the speaker after the speech has taken place; 9 it prevents
the speech from ever taking place.'19
The Supreme Court has ruled on two important cases
concerning prior restraint and national security."l
In Near v.
Minnesota,"5 the Supreme Court struck down a state statute, which
prevented the publication of a periodical that criticized local
officials.'" The Court stated that the Constitution's guarantees
against censorship are not absolute and mentioned several exceptions
that would justify prior restraint. For example, "[g]overnment
[during wartime] might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops."''
This dictum has served as the
19 Prior restraint presumes that any governmental action that prevents a form
of expression from occurring is constitutionally invalid. See, e.g., Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
19 Defamation actions and criminal punishment of categories of speech, such
as fighting words, false and deceptive advertising, and obscenity, all punish the
speaker after the speech has taken place.
19 Because prior restraint prevents speech from taking place, the Supreme Court
has stated that "any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (system of informal censorship held
unconstitutional where a state-created commission organized to review published
materials for sale notified distributors that the publications were objectionable for
sale, distribution or display to youths under 18 years of age, notified distributors
that copies of lists of objectionable materials would be circulated to local police
departments and that the commission would recommend criminal prosecution).
19 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York Times v. United States,
403 U.S. 539 (1976) (the Pentagon Papers case).
"s 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
196 Id. at 722-23.
197 Id. at 716.
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genesis of the national security exception to prior restraint.
In New York Times v. United States,'" the Court stated that
the government carries a heavy burden in showing a justification for
prior restraint.'9 The Court then struck down the government's
request for an injunction against the New York Times' publication of
information concerning the Vietnam War. The government claimed
that the information concerned national security and should be
restrained from publication.'
The Court disagreed, holding that
the government did not meet its heavy burden in overcoming the
presumption that prior restraint is constitutionally invalid.'
Under Near and New York Times, any action by the DOD that
constitutes prior restraint bears the heavy burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality of such restraint. Accordingly, the
government's defense of a regulation such as the DOD's suppression
of the Stealth bomber report, 2' would be met with significant
contest. The report does not even fall within the Near dictum, which
would allow prior restraint of sailing dates and troop locations.'
Not only did the military change the wording of the report, but it
then suppressed the entire article for such a long period of time that
it was no longer newsworthy.' °4 Another example concerned the
censorship of the fact that military pilots had been watching
pornographic movies before bombing missions.' 5 This latter
example cannot be justified by national security as it has nothing to
do with military operation. It is a clear example of the military
unconstitutionally censoring information to avoid embarrassment.
C. Permit Requirements
The controversial imposition of a permit requirement for
participation in a "press pool," also raises First Amendment
questions. In order to gain access to military bases and the
battlefield within the Persian Gulf theater, reporters had to be
19 403

U.S. 539 (1976) (6-3 decision).

403 U.S. 714 (per curiam statement).
Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 714 (per curiam statement).
See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
Near, 283 U.S. 697 (liberty of the press is not an absolute right, and the state
may punish its abuse).
2 Id.
I See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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members of the press pool;? however, not every reporter could be
part of this press pool. DOD gave preference to "media that
principally served the American public and that have a long-term
presence covering Department of Defense military operations."'
This in effect denied access to many freelance press reporters.'
The DOD's press pool can also be analyzed as unconstitutional
license requirement.' The licensing requirements imposed by the
DOD are different and more burdensome than the traditional licenses
that have been challenged before the Supreme Court in the past.21
Prior licensing cases dealt with the speaker having to obtain a license
in order to speak,2" distribute pamphlets, 12 or have parades.1
The DOD's license requirements, on the other hand, implicate the
obtaining of information and access to certain restricted areas. 1 4
The Court has been explicit in its disdain for such licensing
requirements and has, therefore, invoked a high level of scrutiny.
"The struggle for freedom of the press was primarily directed against
the power of the licensor., 21 1 The Supreme Court has held "that a
law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior
restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite
The Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558,
1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("News personnel who are not members of the official
CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas.").
2 Id. at 1564.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
Kunz v. New York 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951) (striking down as clearly invalid
prior restraint on the exercise of a First Amendment right, a street speaking permit
requirement which made it unlawful to ridicule or denounce any form of religious

belief).
20 See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (declaring unconstitutional an
ordinance forbidding the distribution anywhere in the town any literature unless
the city manager has issued a permit); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(upholding a municipal ordinance requiring a permit for a parade because it set
forth an elaborate procedural requirement for the hearing of permit requests that
were content neutral).
211

2

Kunz, 340 U.S. at 294.
Lovell, 303 U.S. 444.

Cox, 312 U.S. 569.
Because press access was discussed earlier, this section will address only the
obtaining of information.
m Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451.
213
4
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'
standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional."216
Since it denies permits to freelance reporters because they are
not part of a traditional reporting agency, the statute is arguably
invalid.217 The DOD admittedly gave preferential treatment to
"media that principally served the American public. 218 This grants
discretionary power to the DOD, which the Supreme Court has held
to be unconstitutional. 9 In Shuttlesworth,' the Supreme Court
stated that ordinances which "make[] the peaceful enjoyment of
freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the
uncontrolled will of an official - as by requiring a permit or license
which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official
- is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the
enjoyment of those freedoms. '"" Thus the DOD's discretionary
power to select which media personnel can access the front lines and
obtain information to report violates the First Amendment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Throughout the Persian Gulf War the actions and regulations
employed by the DOD raise a plethora of First Amendment issues.
Although the courts have not ruled on whether the DOD's actions
were unconstitutional, this article has analyzed the actions by the
DOD according to traditional First Amendment tests applied by the
Supreme Court. Some of the issues raised would be of first
impression if they were to be brought before the Court. This article
analyzed those issues by analogy. Although the Court may need to
develop a different analytical approach which more effectively
weighs all the rights involved in this context, there is a strong case
that the DOD's actions would not pass the tests that the Court has
traditionally applied.
Last spring a group of Members of Congress got a letter from
the Salvadoran Ambassador to the United States, in response to
216 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham 349 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (striking

down an ordinance requiring a permit to march on city streets because there was
unbridled authority to issue or withhold the permit).
17 See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
218 The Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558,
1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
29 Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151.
0 394 U.S. 147 (1%9).
m Id. at 151.
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protest they had lodged about the detention of foreign journalists.
"The Government of El Salvador knows full well that a journalist's
mission is to cover daily events fully and broadly, to protect our
constitutional and legal freedom of expression," the Ambassador
wrote. "The Government also understands that conditions of armed
combat limit these rights, as we have seen most vividly in the
Persian Gulf conflict. ' 22
Once, America's strong freedom of speech guarantees were
held up as a model for the rest of the world to emulate. Now,
apparently, it is our government's genius at news management.
Indeed, the highest compliment paid to the Pentagon's handling of
the press during the Gulf war came from that master spin doctor
Michael Deaver, who said: "If you were to hire a public-relations
firm to do the media relations for an international event, it couldn't
be done any better than this is being done.'' m
Despite the core First Amendment values at stake, 4 the
one significant legal challenge to the Department of Defense rules
came to nothing. On April 16, Judge Leonard Sand of U.S. District
Court in Manhattan dismissed the lawsuit brought by several
publications and writers against the restrictions on press coverage
imposed by the Pentagon during the Persian Gulf war.' Judge
Sand called the issues "too abstract and conjectural" 6 to decide
now that the war is over, leaving the constitutional issues "for
mLetter

from Miguel A. Salaverria, Ambassador, El Salvador, to Rep. Robert

G. Torricelli (D.N.J.) et al. (March 5, 1991) (on file with author).
' Alex S. Jones, War in the Gulf. The Press;Process of News Reporting on Display,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 1991, at A15.

' These have been summarized in a recent report, COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS OF
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CIY OF NEw YORK, MILITARY RESTRICTIONS

ON PRESS COVERAGE: THE UNACCEPTABILrIY OF THE PENTAGON'S POLICIES DURING
THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT (July 1991). While the issue of press access to military

operations has not been the direct subject of any Supreme Court decision, a host
of other cases have invalidated restrictions on the ability of the press to act as a
surrogate for the general public and required the government to prove, even where

there exist legitimate and compelling reasons for restricting access, that the means
chosen be narrowly drawn to serve those ends. See, e.g., Matter of Express News,
695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982) (any limitation on access to jurors must be
"narrowly tailored to prevent a substantial threat"); Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124,
130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (a reporter may not be barred from White House press facilities

"for less than compelling reasons.").
' Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1556
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
22

Id. at 1562.
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another day when the controversy is more sharply focused." 7
In fighting the lawsuit, the government's lawyers did
everything they could to keep the issues out of focus, and in the
process demonstrated some maneuvers that would be envied by the
generals. While the war was on, they blocked every effort to take
testimony from the architect of the news management policies, Pete
Williams, on the grounds that he was too busy. When the war
ended, they argued the case was moot.
One regrettable aspect of the Nation lawsuit is that it was not
joined by more "mainstream" publications. While criticism of the
curbs on coverage by the large metropolitan dailies, the major
television networks and the weekly news magazines was generally
muted while the war was taking place, fifteen Washington Bureau
chiefs recently sent a report to Defense Secretary Cheney that was
strongly critical of wartime news management policies. In a letter
accompanying the report, they wrote: "[w]e believe the Pentagon
pool arrangements during Operation Desert Storm made it
impossible for reporters and photographers to tell the public the full
story of the war in a timely fashion. Moreover, we believe it is
imperative that the Gulf war not serve as a model for future
coverage."'
But there is every indication that the Pentagon believes the
Gulf war experience makes an excellent model for future coverage.
It plans an internal review of the Gulf press rules, and says it may
make possible adjustments for future wars, but it seems unlikely to
result in reforms unless substantial pressure is applied from other
quarters. 229 The interim Pentagon report to Congress pronounces
the rules an overall success and declares that Pentagon briefings
"provided an unprecedented amount of information about the war
to the American people."'
There is nothing a government can do that is more serious
than going to war. But the Pentagon's legal and public relations
victories leave intact an unprecedented policy of information control
that made it virtually impossible to learn what the government didn't
want to tell us about the war.
Id. at 1575.
' Letter from Roone Arledge, ABC News, et al., to Secretary of the Department
of Defense Dick Cheney Uune 24, 1991) (on file with author).
2N Id.
2

230U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CoNDUCr OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT: AN
INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS 19-3 (July, 1991).
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With the courts unreceptive to the serious freedom of
expression issues at stake, Congress should conduct a full inquiry
into the effects of the press curbs on the public's right to know, and
require the Department of Defense to adopt new Rules that treat the
press not as an inconvenience and an obstacle, but as a necessity for
a well-informed public.

